Goodwood began when the British VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, attacked to seize the German-held Bourguébus Ridge, the area between Bretteville-sur-Laize and Vimont and to inflict maximum casualties on the Germans.[11] Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left, to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.[17][18] The Battle of Villers-Bocage saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town but by 17 June, Panzer Lehr had been forced back and XXX Corps had taken Tilly-sur-Seulles.[19][20] The British postponed plans for further offensive operations, including a second attack by the 7th Armoured Division, when a severe storm descended upon the English Channel on 19 June.The newly arrived VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor), was to attack west of Caen, southwards across the Odon and Orne rivers, capture an area of high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize, encircling the city.[30] By 9 July, Caen north of the Orne and Odon rivers had been captured but German forces retained possession of the south bank and a number of important locations, including the Colombelles steel works, whose tall chimneys commanded the area.[33] In early July, Montgomery had been informed by the Adjutant-General to the Forces, Ronald Adam that due to the manpower shortage in Britain, the pool of replacements to maintain his infantry strength was nearly exhausted.[d] In the outline for Goodwood, VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, would attack southwards out of the Orne bridgehead, a pocket of ground east of the river taken by the Allies on D-Day in Operation Deadstick.[56] The British and Canadian operations were tentatively scheduled for 18 July and Cobra was postponed for two days, to enable the First Army to secure its start line around Saint-Lô.[60] The detailed orders for the II Canadian Corps were issued a day later, for the capture of Colombelles, the remaining portion of Caen and then be ready to move on the strongly held Verrières (Bourguébus) Ridge.[60] Second Army intelligence had formed a good estimate of the opposition Goodwood was likely to face, although the German positions beyond the first line of villages had to be inferred, mainly from inconclusive air reconnaissance.The three armoured divisions moved to their staging positions west of the Orne only at night and in radio silence; artillery fire was used to mask the noise of the tank engines.[78] Additional support would be provided by three ships of the Royal Navy, whose targets were German gun batteries located near the coast in the region of Cabourg and Franceville.[73] As the final elements of the 11th Armoured Division moved into position and the VIII Corps headquarters took up residence in Bény-sur-Mer, more gaps in the minefields were blown, the forward areas were signposted and routes to be taken marked with white tape.[90] The Germans considered the Caen area to be the foundation of their position in Normandy and were determined to maintain a defensive arc from the English Channel to the west bank of the Orne.[95] As dark fell, camera-equipped aircraft managed to bring back photographs taken by the light of flares, which revealed a one-way flow of traffic over the Orne into the British bridgehead.[97][98][99] The 21st Panzer Division reconnaissance and pioneer battalions, were positioned on the Bourguébus Ridge to protect the corps artillery, which consisted of around 48 field and medium guns with an equal number of Nebelwerfer rocket launchers.The following day the 12th SS Panzer Division was placed in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) reserve to rest and refit and—on Hitler's orders—to be in a position to meet a feared second Allied landing between the Orne and Seine rivers.[104] Greenline was intended to convince the German command that the main British assault would be launched west of the Orne, through the positions held by XII Corps and to tie down the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, so that they could not oppose Goodwood or Cobra.[65][113] "For forty-five minutes the procession of bombers came on unbroken and when they'd gone, the thunder of the guns swelled up and filled the air, as the artillery carried on the bombardment" Shortly before dawn on 18 July, the Highland infantry in the south of the Orne bridgehead, quietly retired 0.5 mi (0.80 km) from the front line.[115] At 05:45, 1,056 Halifax and Lancaster heavy bombers flying at 3,000 ft (910 m) dropped 4,800 long tons (4,900 t) of high explosive bombs around Colombelles, the steelworks, on the positions of the 21st Panzer Division and on the village of Cagny, reducing half of it to rubble.From 10,000–13,000 ft (3,000–4,000 m), American Marauders released 563 long tons (572 t) of fragmentation bombs on the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, as fighter-bombers attacked German strong points and gun positions.Fifteen minutes later, American heavy bombers dropped 1,340 long tons (1,360 t) of fragmentation bombs in the Troarn area and on the main German gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge.Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers, carrying RP-3 rockets, were directed onto the ridge during the afternoon, delaying and eventually breaking up the 1st SS Panzer Division counter-attack.[137] A final attempt to storm the ridge resulted in the loss of 16 British tanks and a small counter-attack during the afternoon was driven off, with the destruction of six German Panthers.At 17:00 near Cuverville it knocked out two Panzer IVs for the loss of four tanks and then cleared Grentheville, bypassed earlier in the day by the 3rd RTR, taking several prisoners.[158][page needed] Tactically, the Germans contained the offensive, holding many of their main positions and preventing an Allied breakthrough but they had been startled by the weight of the attack and preliminary aerial bombardment.[67] It was clear that any defensive system less than 5 mi (8.0 km) deep could be overwhelmed at a stroke and the Germans could afford to man their defences in such depth only in the sector south of Caen.[165] In the planning of Goodwood, Montgomery appeared to promise that the attack would be a breakthrough and that when the VIII Corps failed to break-out, by some accounts the Supreme Commander, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, felt he had been misled.While his intermittent communications to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) appeared to promise a breakthrough, Montgomery was writing orders to his subordinates for a limited attack.
The planned attack for operations Atlantic and Goodwood. It shows where the Second Army knew the locations of several German divisions as well as where they believed others were.
Camouflaged
Churchill tanks
of the 31st Tank Brigade, which did not take part in Goodwood, highlighting the efforts taken in Normandy to hide vehicles from enemy observers.