Battle for Hill 140
It unfolded some miles east of the village of Estrées-la-Campagne, Normandie, when during a night attack, the Canadian troops deviated from the axis of advance, occupying an area contrary to the orders of their own command.Guy Simonds, envisaged that Allied units would penetrate German defensive lines to a depth of 20 km and swiftly seize the hills directly north of the town of Falaise.The 1st AD (commanded by Brigadier General Stanisław Maczek) was tasked with capturing the village of Cauvicourt and the Hill 140, located 5 km to the south, from which the crossings on the Laison river could be controlled.Meanwhile, acting to the right of the Poles, the 4th AD (commanded by Major General George Kitching) was to advance along the Caen–Falaise road (Route Nationale 158) and capture another key terrain feature – Hill 195.Tanks and transporters followed one another, and the cohesion of the long column moving in the darkness of the night depended on the drivers maintaining continuous visual contact with the vehicle in front of them.According to the plan, the formation crossed Route Nationale 158, passed the positions of the "Lake Superior" Regiment preparing for the attack on Bretteville-le-Rabet, and then, sticking to the eastern side of the road, headed south.Worthington faced a choice of whether to halt and wait until the town was cleared or to deviate from the route, bypass the village with a wide arc from the east, and continue the attack.The battle group indeed veered east and bypassed Bretteville-le-Rabet, but instead of eventually turning west and returning to RN 158, for unknown reasons, they continued to move southeast along a secondary road known as Chemin Haussé.However, it was found and personally brought back by the company commander; as it turned out, the platoon had strayed from the road after detecting and destroying a position of two 88 mm guns, eliminating their 30-man crew in a bayonet charge.[17] The relative ease with which the Canadian battle group penetrated so deep behind enemy lines was not only due to the surprise caused by the night attack on the Germans.Thus, the unexpected appearance of Worthington's forces there drove a wedge between the units of the 12th SS Panzer Division, threatened its headquarters (only 3 km away), and cut off the retreat route for Kampfgruppe Waldmüller.Shortly after their appearance in the vicinity of Hill 140, Worthington's tanks were detected by SS-Obersturmführer Meitzel, a staff officer assigned to Kampfgruppe Wünsche.He immediately notified SS-Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, who passed on the information to Meyer, who in turn ordered the Canadians to be eliminated as quickly as possible.[23] Several surviving Tigers from the 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, which had fought the previous day as part of Kampfgruppe Waldmüller, also joined the fight.[28] In the meantime, two surviving tanks from the shattered Squadron A arrived with the news that the Germans had already occupied the western and northern approaches, trapping Worthington's forces.[33] However, they failed to even approach Hill 195 as they were repelled by accurate fire from 88 mm guns placed in the Quesnay forest, losing 26 tanks in the process.Shortly after repelling the initial counterattack, while discussing with Worthington the plan for further defense, an anti-tank shell hit the tank behind which they were both standing, and one of the fragments severed Hay's leg.[28] Due to the steadily increasing number of wounded, for whom assistance couldn't be provided in the battlefield conditions, Worthington agreed to evacuate them on 11 still operational armored cars under the command of Captain Lewis.[39] In the afternoon, Wünsche's forces were reinforced by the 1st company of the 12th SS Tank Destroyer Battalion (equipped with Jagdpanzer IV self-propelled guns) and units from the 85th Infantry Division.[35][1] However, this opportunity was not seized, and the destruction of the Canadian formation enabled the Germans to resolve the crisis caused by the enemy tanks penetrating their rear and to restore the continuity of the defensive lines north of Falaise.Controversy has particularly arisen over three issues: the reason for the group losing its way, the inability to determine its location and provide assistance by the Canadian command, and the stance of the Polish 1st Armored Division.Among the most likely factors cited are: the stress and excitement associated with entering combat;[54][55] the haste with which the group moved, wanting to reach its objective before dawn;[43] the common mistake made by soldiers of forcibly matching the terrain to the map;[56] lack of training in night maneuvers;[56] terrain lacking distinctive landmarks;[4] morning fog and dust clouds emanating from the vehicle tracks, further impairing visibility.Based on this, Canadian historian Mike Bechthold argues that Worthington, disoriented upon encountering Chemin Haussé, mistook it for the equally wide and straight Route Nationale 158,[58] which may have been reinforced by the similarity of the forests and hills near both roads.[59] Despite the severed direct communication with the brigade headquarters, Worthington's forces did not find themselves in complete isolation, and various Allied units established contact with them during the battle.[60] The burning tanks of Worthington were also seen by a British artillery observer from his advanced position near the Quesnay forest, but like Brigadier Lane, he mistook them for Polish and did not notify anyone about it.[65] Meanwhile, General Simonds' aide-de-camp, Captain Stearns, stated that some Polish units turned back in the face of relatively weak enemy resistance.English wrote, the actions of Worthington's battle group compared to the other units illustrated the depth of tactical schizophrenia afflicting the armored forces of the British and Canadian armies.[72][73] However, according to other Canadian accounts, this occurred before 5:30 P.M.[40] Criticisms were also leveled at the slow pace of the Polish regiment's advance, which was deemed too cautious, identifying any encountered German tanks and armored guns as Tigers.[77] The dynamic maneuver surprised the Germans, allowing the Poles to advance about 3 km and capture Hill 111, which was only a few hundred meters from the position held by the Canadian battle group.Shortly thereafter, due to the approaching darkness, lack of infantry support, the close presence of a strong enemy, and increasing losses, Major Stefanowicz ordered a retreat.
World War IIWestern FrontOperation TotalizeAugust 9Estrées-la-CampagneNormandyFranceCanadaGermanyMax WünscheOperation OverlordAtlantic WallBodyguardFortitudeZeppelinTitanicTaxable, Glimmer & Big DrumCombined Bomber OffensivePointblankTransport PlanPostage AbleTarbrushFabiusCaen canal and Orne river bridgesMerville BatteryMallardAmerican SectorAlbanyBostonChicagoDetroitElmiraNormandy landingsPointe du HocGambitPort-en-BessinAmericanOperation ChastityBritishMulberryBrécourt ManorGraignesLa Haye-du-PuitsSaint-LôCarentanHill 30CherbourgBrévilleVillers-BocageLe Mesnil-PatryNormandy massacresArdenne AbbeyDouvresMartletWindsorCharnwoodJupiter2nd OdonAtlanticGoodwoodVerrières RidgeSpringBluecoatTotalizeLüttichTractableHill 262ChamboisFalaiseSaint-MaloMantes-GassicourtLa RochelleUshantLa CainePierres NoiresAudierne BayJedburghDingsonSamwestCooneyBulbasketHoundsworthLoytonKiplingDragoonWallace & HardyCemeteries4th Canadian Division12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend"NormandieNormandy campaignII Canadian CorpsGuy Simonds1st Armoured DivisionCintheauxCramesnilStanisław MaczekCauvicourtGeorge KitchingBretteville-le-RabetShermanM2 half-trackKurt Meyer89th Infantry DivisionkampfgruppenRouvres85th Infantry Division88 mm gunsPantherpanzergrenadierStuartAusterPotignyRoyal Air ForceTyphoonsJagdpanzer IVCrusaderI SS Panzer CorpsOperation TractableKnight's CrossMaizièresBretteville-sur-LaizeContinental Ranges10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade24th Uhlan Regiment1st Armoured Regiment