Battle of Verrières Ridge

Strict German adherence to defensive doctrine, as well as strong and effective counterattacks by Panzer formations, resulted in many Allied casualties for little tactical gain.[1] From the perspective of the First Canadian Army, the battle is remembered for its tactical and strategic miscalculations—the most notable being a highly controversial attack by The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada on 25 July, in which 315 of its 325 soldiers were killed, wounded or captured.Although an important D-Day objective for Commonwealth forces, the Allied push inland was halted short of Caen and positional warfare ensued until the first week of July.[5] On 9 July, Operation Charnwood captured the northern half of the city but the I SS Panzer Corps maintained defensive positions in the remainder of Caen.[9][14][15] While British forces had been attacking Caen, elements of the I SS Panzer Corps, part of Army Group B (Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge) had turned Verrières Ridge into their main defensive position along the Anglo-Canadian front.[1] In a follow-up to Operation Goodwood on 19 July, the Calgary Highlanders attempted to take the northern spur of Verrières Ridge but German mortar fire limited their progress.[4][20] At the same time, the South Saskatchewan Regiment moved directly up the slopes of Verrières Ridge, supported by tanks and Hawker Typhoon ground attack aircraft.[17] Minor counter-attacks by both battalions on 21 July managed to contain Dietrich's armoured formations and by the time the operation was called off, Canadian forces held several footholds on the ridge, including a now secure position on Point 67.[3] Very few members of the Black Watch Regiment managed to make it to the crest of the ridge and those who did were subjected to an even heavier bombardment as they ran into the counter-attacking forces of the 272nd Infantry Division and the 9th SS Kampfgruppe Sterz.[33][36] With German defences weakened, subsequent Commonwealth attacks on the ridge were successful; Operation Totalize finally managed to wrest the position from its SS defenders on 8 August.Stacey attributes this to the gradual degradation of the German logistics chain, leaving incomplete records, and Reynolds wrote that units sometimes over-reported their losses, in the hope of receiving more reinforcements.[42] The report on Operation Spring by Simonds was released after the war and blamed its failure on "11th hour reinforcement" of German lines and "strategically unsound execution on the part of Major Phillip Griffin and the Black Watch".[17][33] Terry Copp and John A. English wrote that given the amount of pressure under which all Allied commanders were to break out from Normandy, Simonds probably had little choice in the decision he made.[37][48] The Battle of Verrières Ridge had little overall effect on British attempts to break out of Caen, as significant resources were transferred to the American front in the aftermath of Cobra to exploit Bradley's success.