Spanish military conspiracy of 1936

Initially it was barely more than an informal group of Madrid-based generals, who agreed to monitor political developments and be ready to intervene in case of breakdown of state structures and a proletarian revolution forthcoming.[1] The 1923 coup of general Miguel Primo de Rivera was praetorian in character; the 6-year-long military dictatorship successfully tackled key immediate problems, but it failed to re-define the regime.The officer corps was generally monarchist rather than republican and conservative rather than progressist, but following last years of Primo dictatorship, which had compromised and discredited the army, most military men preferred to stay clear of politics.[4] This proved fertile soil for growth of corporative disenchantment and loose conspiracy by a minor fraction of the officer corps, which produced the politically vague 1932 coup known as Sanjurjada, defeated easily in slightly more than 24 hours.In 1933-1935 the army did not play a protagonist role in politics,[5] except that in October 1934 it was engaged in defending the constitutional republican regime against a localized revolution staged by Anarchist, Socialist and Catalanist groupings;[6] combat involved much bloodshed and massive repression followed.[8] General elections of February 1936 produced the triumph of Popular Front, the alliance partially composed of parties which organized the 1934 revolution and the one which placed amnesty to the revolutionaries as the key point of its program.On election night triumphant celebrations in many cities turned into riots and produced numerous assaults on town halls and prisons;[9] a few highly-positioned officers suggested that the government introduce state of war, which by some scholars is considered the first, unsuccessful attempt of a military coup.[12] In early March legal action was launched against some officers who had fought the 1934 revolution,[13] while radical parties demanded that all state functionaries involved in repressing the 1934 rebels be subject to juridical proceedings.According to the official ministerial list, the most senior one was 1) Rodriguez del Barrio, followed by 2) Villegas, 3) Saliquet, 4) González Carrasco, 5) Franco, 6) Fanjul (division generals), 7) Orgaz, and 8) Mola (brigadiers).Some generals (especially Goded, after del Barrio the second highest-ranking conspirator and by some historians considered "el principal inspirador de la conspiración militar")[17] were absent, though aware and supportive.[18] The generals did not decide to stage a coup; instead, they agreed to watch political developments closely and get ready for intervention in case of total breakdown of public order, dissolution of Guardia Civil, release of all conscripts, or armed rising on part of the Left.Some time in mid-March Sanjurjo, who was in touch with conspirators by means of emissaries and encrypted postal correspondence, accepted the leadership role,[20] with del Barrio as the one “quien me gusta más” and Varela as “le mejor cabeza y el único intelligente”.This irritated Sanjurjo, who from his Portuguese exile pushed for immediate action; he developed doubts about what he considered an indecisive stand of the Madrid conspirators and as a measure of encouragement pledged to move to Spain the same moment the coup is declared.[23] A review, performed by the plotters and dated early April, listed Morocco, Valladolid, Burgos, Pamplona, Vitoria and Zaragoza garrisons as firmly adhering to conspiracy, with Madrid unclear and Barcelona highly doubtful;[24] first personal suggestions, later largely to be changed, were offered.Thanks to a warning from conspirators in state security structures Mola managed to outsmart director general de Seguridad, who on June 3 showed up in Pamplona but found no compromising evidence.[48] Until mid-June numerous military issues remained far from solved; the Pamplona-based Mola complained that even in the neighboring San Sebastián “there are conspirators, but there is no conspiracy” with no command layer appointed.[63] It was so either because they were concerned about insufficiently developed conspiracy, or because they did not consider the situation in the country bad enough and hoped for radical left-wing fervour to fizzle out, or because they retained a sense of loyalty to the regime, or simply because they feared consequences of failure, especially in terms of their personal lot and this of their families.[75] Historians present him as “otra mediocridad”[76] and an “inept, if not entirely incompetent” minister,[77] generally lacking energy and determination, but at times carried away by his republican zeal up to the point of irresponsibility.However, soon he nominated Juan Moles, a 67-year-old independent Catalanist republican with some experience as the mayor of Barcelona, alto comisario in Morocco, and briefly the Generalitat president; neither he had any record in security and demonstrated little competence as head of Interior, in historiography also dubbed as "el irresponsable".[79] Their deputies were respectively Juan José Cremades, a 35-year-old IR lawyer who failed to make it to history books, and Bibiano Osorio Tafal, a 34-year-old biology scholar of radical views who got the job as Casares’ fellow member of the ORGA.The key man in republican structures responsible for security issues was José Alonso Mallol, a 42-year-old lawyer and former member of PRRS who in the early 1930s briefly served as civil governor.Historiographic opinions on Mallol differ; to some he "had worked tirelessly to combat Falangist terrorism and to monitor the activities of hostile officers",[82] to some he also lacked competence in security matters and was "no demasiado eficiente",[83] especially that he failed to find that some of his subordinates, like a high DGS functionary Santiago Martín Báguenas, were members of the conspiracy.[85] In May a successful action of security services unearthed hundreds of fake Guardia Civil uniforms in Madrid, but this was part of an independent Carlist scheme, only loosely related to military conspiracy.[87] Once informers started pointing to Mola, in early June Mallol raided Pamplona with DGS men, but they failed to find any firm evidence and counter-action was limited to detentions of secondary figures, like colonel Utrilla.[88] However, alarming news kept coming: information about unusual officers’ meetings in the barracks, discovery of non-evidenced firearms stocks, identification of strange arrangements in arms factories, cryptic conversations on tapped phone lines, UMRA warnings related to specific commanders, and intercepted written messages.[102] One more reason is that republican politicians did not have Spanish military in high regard, and considered them mostly inept, mediocre and incompetent; within this perspective, officers formed a closed social caste which cared mostly about their salaries or, at best, women.Then, 3) vital infrastructural points were to follow: these included radio broadcasting stations, CAMPSA fuel depots, post and telegraph offices, prisons, power plants, banks, hydrological installations; continuity of their operations was to be ensured.[138] He thought failure in some garrisons likely, e.g. in Barcelona, where insurgency might have bordered a semi-suicidal attempt,[139] or in Madrid, where (as option B) he instructed rebels to remain in the barracks and await arrival of northern columns.[165] Some scholars, however, quote documents which envisioned a decisively distinct version, with earlier legislation as to "materia religiosa y social" reverted, the party system abolished and vague references to "otros países" setting an example.However, no scholar claims that the system which emerged from the war was anywhere near the plans held by the conspirators, let alone that any of the plotting generals envisioned Francisco Franco as an absolute ruler, one state party, a parliament of appointees and almost 40 years of dictatorship.