Siege of Mostar
Between June 1993 and April 1994 the HVO besieged Bosniak-concentrated East Mostar, resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians, a cut off of humanitarian aid, damage or destruction of ten mosques, and the blowing up of the historic Stari Most bridge.[8][9] In November, the autonomous Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ H-B) was established, it claimed it had no secessionary goal and that it would serve a "legal basis for local self-administration".On 4 February 1992, local Croat citizens blockaded the roads from Mostar to Čitluk and Široki Brijeg in protest over the behavior of JNA reservists in the area.[5] On 15 April, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) was formed, with slightly over two-thirds of troops consisting of Bosniaks and almost one-third of Croats and Serbs.[17] On 19 April 1992, General Momčilo Perišić, the commander of the 13th Bileća Corps in Mostar, ordered the artillery units to attack the neighbourhoods of Cim, Ilići, Bijeli Brijeg and Donja Mahala.[19] In February 1992, in the first of many meetings, Boban, Josip Manolić,[20] Tuđman's aide and previously the Croatian Prime Minister, and Radovan Karadžić, president of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, met in Graz, Austria to discuss the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the necessary population transfers.The parties ultimately parted ways and on the following day the JNA and Bosnian Serb forces, later renamed to Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), mounted an attack on Croat-held positions on the eastern river bank.In mid-June 1992, after the battle line moved eastward, the HVO demolished the Serbian Orthodox Žitomislić Monastery, while the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity was burned by an unidentified group.[30] In opinion polls conducted in Serbia during the 2000s by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Group less than 20 percent of respondents believed that the JNA actually besieged Mostar.[32] Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party held important positions in the Bosnian government including the premiership and the ministry of defence, but despite this carried out a separate policy and refused for the HVO to be integrated into ARBiH.[34] There were also regional lobbies with diverging interests within the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which included Sarajevo, Central Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bosanska Krajina and Sandžak.He received an ultimatum from Boban warning that if he did not proclaim a confederation with Tuđman that Croatian forces would not help defend Sarajevo from strongholds as close as 40 kilometres (25 mi) away.[38] In June and July, Boban increased pressure "by blocking delivery of arms that the Sarajevo government, working around a United Nations (UN) embargo on all shipments to the former Yugoslavia, has secretly bought.[44] Cooperation was inharmonious, but enabled the transportation of weapons to ARBiH through Croatia in spite of the UN sanctioned arms embargo,[5] reopening channels blocked by Boban.[48] By October, the agreement had collapsed and afterwards Croatia diverted delivery of weaponry to Bosnia and Herzegovina by seizing a significant amount for itself[49] and Boban had abandoned a Bosnian government alliance.As escalation continued the Zagreb government deployed HV units and Ministry of the Interior (MUP RH) special forces into Bosnia and Herzegovina.[48] Božo Raić, the Bosnian Croat defence minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina and HDZ member,[52] blamed the Serbian government for the rift and asked the Bosniak side to "sober up".HVO soldiers conducted mass arrests of Muslims in West Mostar and separated the men from the women, children and elderly persons."[64] The HVO expelled Bosniaks in areas of Mostar that it controlled or sent them to camps in Dretelj, Heliodrom, Gabela, and Ljubuški where they were starved, tortured, and killed.[65] The main combat locations on 9 May were the HVO-held Tihomir Mišić barracks and the ARBiH headquarters in western Mostar in the basement of a building complex referred to as Vranica.[68] On 30 June the ARBiH captured the Tihomir Mišić barracks on the east bank of the Neretva, a hydroelectric dam on the river and the main northern approaches to the city.[70] Both sides settled down and turned to shelling and sniping at each other, though the HVO superior heavy weaponry caused severe damage to eastern Mostar.The ICTY found that "during this period, East Mostar and the neighbourhood of Donja Mahala in the west were subjected to a prolonged military assault by the HVO, including intense and uninterrupted gunfire and shelling.[62] During the Croat-Bosniak conflict, the Serbs, who were still the strongest force, cooperated with both Bosniaks and Croats, pursuing a local balancing policy and allying with the weaker side.[73][74] On 22 October, Tuđman instructed Šušak and Bobetko to continue to support Herzeg-Bosnia, believing that "the future borders of the Croatian state are being resolved there.[81] The ICTY in the Prlić et al. case concluded that the bridge was a legitimate military target for the HVO, but that its destruction caused disproportionate damage to the Bosniak civilian population of Mostar.[82] Presiding judge Jean-Claude Antonetti issued a separate opinion and said that "an analysis of the video footage did not make it possible for the Chamber to determine beyond reasonable doubt who caused the final collapse of the Stari Most.[12] By February 1994, the Secretary-General of the UN reported that between 3,000 and 5,000 Croatian regular troops were in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the UN Security Council condemned Croatia, warning that if it didn't end "all forms of interference" there would be "serious measures" taken.[87] On 26 February talks began in Washington, D.C. between the Bosnian government leaders and Mate Granić, Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss the possibilities of a permanent ceasefire and a confederation of Bosniak and Croat regions.According to a Novi list report, Ivić Pašalić, who was a key adviser to Tuđman and acted on his behalf, led a three-man delegation near Banja Luka to discuss with Karadžić the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnian WarCroat–Bosniak WarMostarBosnia and HerzegovinaHerzeg-BosniaCroatiaRepublic of Bosnia and HerzegovinaYugoslav People's ArmyRepublika SrpskaMilivoj PetkovićSlobodan PraljakSefer HalilovićRasim DelićArif PašalićMomčilo PerišićSarajevoSarajevo JNA columnJNA campaignKupresZvornikVišegradPrijedor cleansingTuzla JNA columnGalaja resistanceBihaćJackalVrbas '92Corridor 92Majevica frontKorićani CliffsMunja '93AzićiŽepčeKravicaŠtrpciTravnikDeny FlightAhmićiTrusinaSovići/DoljaniDobrinjaBugojnoSadejstvoMokronogeGrabovicaNeretva '93Lukavac '93Stupni DoKrižančevo SeloBanja LukaBuna 94Tvigi 94Brana '94Washington AgreementStar '94Goražde air strikesBøllebankAmandaSarajevo incidentSpider2nd KupresShield '94Vučja PlaninaUdbina airstrikeWinter '94Vučja mountainMajevicaVlašićOrašjePale airstrikesTekbir '95Vrbanja BridgeKrivaja '95MassacreStupčanica '95VozućaMiracleSummer '95Deliberate ForceMistral 2Prijedor '95Southern MoveCroatian Defence CouncilArmy of the Republic of Bosnia and HerzegovinaindependenceYugoslaviaOperation JackalCroatian Armythe wider conflictBosnian CroatsBosniakshumanitarian aidmosquesStari MostHostilitiesCroat–Bosniak federationSerbian Autonomous RegionsBosnian SerbsSerbian Democratic PartyHerzegovinaAlija IzetbegovićFranjo TuđmanSlobodan Miloševićin Karađorđevopartition of Bosnia and HerzegovinaMate BobanCroatian War of IndependenceČitlukŠiroki Brijegindependence referendumBosnian CroatbarricadesColonel GeneralMilutin Kukanjac1992 Battle of KupresTomislavgradGeneralPavle StrugarBilećaTitogradStolacNeretvaYugoslav Air ForceTerritorial Defence Forcehydroelectric power plantsIlići