Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence
Portions of the phase II report not released at that time include the review of public statements by U.S. government leaders prior to the war, and the assessment of the activities of Douglas Feith and the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans.In the first half of 2002, a series of public statements by President Bush and senior members of his administration indicated a willingness to use force, if necessary, to remove Saddam Hussein from power.Over the next several months the U.S. conducted a diplomatic effort at the United Nations, seeking to obtain that body's approval for a new WMD inspection regime, and, potentially, for the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government.The UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling on Iraq to make "an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure" of its WMD programs, and threatening "serious consequences" if it did not comply.As part of that effort U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003, in which he detailed false intelligence gatherings regarding Iraqi WMD.The USA was faced with the opposition of a majority of the Security Council's members, including Germany, France, and Russia, and afterwards abandoned the effort to obtain an explicit use-of-force authorization from the UN.The following eight Democrats made up the rest of the Committee: Vice-Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Carl Levin (D-MI), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Ronald Wyden (D-OR), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Evan Bayh (D-IN), John Edwards (D-NC), and Barbara Mikulski (D-MD).The new elements added to the investigation were: On June 17, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller announced that the completed report had been unanimously approved by the Committee's members, and that they were working with the CIA on the issue of declassification.The 511-page report focuses much of its attention on the October, 2002, classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.It also discusses the process whereby references to Iraq's uranium-procurement efforts were removed from some speeches at the behest of intelligence officials, but left in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address.There is discussion of "CURVEBALL," an Iraqi defector who provided much of the information regarding Iraq's alleged mobile bioweapons labs, although much of the material in this part of the report has been redacted.The report concludes that the October 2002 NIE and other statements regarding Iraq's biological and chemical WMD and associated delivery systems were for the most part not supported by the underlying intelligence data supplied to the Committee.Despite this, the Committee concluded that "[m]uch of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect."In part, the white paper was a response to Congressional requests for an unclassified version of the information in the NIE, since that document was available only to a small group of lawmakers due to its classified nature.Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been present in Baghdad, and Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization that identified itself as the "sworn enemy" of Saddam Hussein had operated in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control.It focuses on the issues of information sharing and Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and rebuts the allegation of "pressure" contained in the additional view by Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin.Senator Olympia Snow (R-ME) wrote in her additional view that the Committee's report revealed poor management and a lack of accountability in the intelligence community, and she called for strong reforms.At the time of the report's release (July 9, 2004), Democratic members of the committee expressed the hope that "phase two" of the investigation, which was to include an assessment of how the Iraqi WMD intelligence was used by senior policymakers, would be completed quickly.On March 10, 2005, during a question-and-answer session after a speech he had given at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Senator Roberts said of the failure to complete phase two, "[T]hat is basically on the back burner."In a statement regarding the release of the report of the presidential WMD commission on March 31, 2005, Senator Roberts wrote, "I don't think there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all regarding prewar intelligence.[9] Two volumes of the phase II report were released on September 8, 2006: "Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments" and "The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress."The report concludes that the intelligence community had assessed that establishing a stable government in Iraq would be a "long, difficult, and probably turbulent challenge," that Iraqi society was deeply divided and would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power took steps to prevent it, and that the war would increase the threat of terrorism, at least temporarily.The intelligence community also assessed that a U.S. defeat and occupation of Iraq would lead to a surge in political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups, and that the war would not cause other countries in the region to abandon their WMD programs.The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.Jay Rockefeller, stated in press release of report's publication "It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa'ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein.[10] Writing for the Minority Opinion as part of the report it was stated that "After four years of making unsubstantiated allegations of unlawful activities, the calculus appears to be that proclamations of "inappropriate" behavior will generate the desired headlines focusing only on the caustic words, rather than the lack of substance behind them.
Colin Powellpresentation to the UN Security CouncilUnited States Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceU.S. intelligence community2003 invasion of IraqOffice of Special PlansGulf WarRichard ButlerBill ClintonOperation Desert FoxGeorge W. BushSeptember 11 attacksjoint resolution authorizing the use of forceresolution 1441a presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003Operation Iraqi Freedominvaded IraqIraq Survey GroupPat RobertsSenate Select Committee on IntelligenceOrrin HatchMichael DeWineKit BondTrent LottOlympia SnoweChuck HagelSaxby ChamblissJohn WarnerJay RockefellerCarl LevinDianne FeinsteinRonald WydenDick DurbinEvan BayhJohn EdwardsBarbara MikulskiMurray WaasCentral Intelligence AgencyDefense Intelligence AgencyDepartment of DefenseCURVEBALLColin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security CouncilJoint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against IraqSaddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theoryAbu Musab al-ZarqawiAnsar al-Islampresidential WMD commissionDouglas FeithNancy PelosiDennis KucinichHouse of RepresentativesimpeachWhite HouseButler ReviewIraq and weapons of mass destructionIraq disarmament crisisIraq Intelligence CommissionUnited Nations Security Council and the Iraq WarU.S. Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceWayback MachineIraq WarIraqi conflictPrelude17 July RevolutionIranian Revolution1979 Ba'ath Party PurgeIran–Iraq WarBritishU.S. support for IraqChemical attacks against IranAnfal campaignIran–Contra affairInvasion of KuwaitNayirah testimonySanctions against IraqNo-fly zones1991 uprisingsUNSCOMArms-to-Iraq affairOil-for-Food ProgrammeInvestigationsAftermathWar on terror2001 anthrax attacksU.S. War in AfghanistanInvasionRationaleWMD claimsYellowcake uraniumAluminum tubesBiological weaponsChemical weapons"Curveball"Mobile weapon labsPragueRicin claimsAmerican imperialismBush DoctrineWolfowitz DoctrineColin Powell's UN presentationDisarmament crisisUNMOVICFailed peace initiativesIraq resolutionUK parliament's support for invasionIraqi–Kurdish conflictLegalityLegitimacy of the invasionMedia coverageMilitary analyst programRapid response operationSaddam's alleged shredderPreemptive warSaddam Hussein and human rightsHabbush letterDowning Street memoSeptember DossierVilnius letterLetter of the eightBush–Blair 2003 memoFebruary DossierBush–Aznar memoInvasion (2003)Occupation (2003–2011)Insurgency2003–06 period