CIA activities in the Soviet Union
In December 1950, with the Korean War in progress, National Intelligence Estimate 15 was issued: "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation".At this time, there was no assumption that China and the USSR would differ on any policy "Moscow, seconded by Peiping with regard to the Far East, has disclosed through a series of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation: It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiations, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete.If this assistance proves inadequate to enable the Viet Minh to accomplish its objectives, it is estimated that it will be supplemented, as necessary, by the introduction of Chinese Communist forces into the conflict, possibly as "volunteers."The report observed, however, that a good deal of information could be derived from knowledge of Soviet science in disciplines that supported biological and chemical warfare.Concern was expressed about knowledge of their progress of their thermonuclear weapon development program Joe-4, their first test, took place in August of the same year and their rate of uranium 235 production.The Intelligence Community believes their area of greatest interest will be Southeast Asia, although they probably will not insert Chinese Communist regular troops.Following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the USSR put increased pressure on its satellite countries, and made it clear to the West that it did not want interference.We believe the basic motivation behind Moscow's current tough line to be its grave concern over its power position in Eastern Europe, where it considers revisionism to have developed to dangerous proportions/Note 1.[6] The analysts felt the USSR has not abandoned the idea of peaceful coexistence with the West, but it probably believes there is little chance for East-West negotiations favorable to it.We believe that recent events do not indicate that the USSR has ceased to desire a conference at the summit or lower level negotiations on matters in which the Soviet leaders have an interest.At the same time, the Soviet leaders may have concluded prior to undertaking their recent moves that, since the chances of an early summit conference on their terms were waning, they could more easily accept the political losses they would suffer in international affairs by pursuing a harder policy in Eastern Europe.[10] In accordance with a previous authorization, NSC 5502/1,[11] as revalidated on 10 November 1960, CIA sponsors a covert action program which supports media3 and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union.Senator Mike Mansfield asked "What would the President think if there were to be established in the Congress a joint Congressional Committee which would oversee the activities of the CIA?"Charles E. Bohlen, special assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Menshikov about Soviet policy toward Cuba, with the response "he had said to Senator Fulbright that Senator Johnson's statement about a submarine base was completely out of this world and provocative; the Soviet Union had no intention of establishing bases or any military arrangements in Cuba.The proposal mentioned "the program supports media and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union."The program as a whole was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs on 21 October and 6 November 1969.A secondary objective is to enlighten important third-country elites, especially political leaders and the public opinion shaping professions, about the repressive nature of the Soviet system and its imperialistic and self-aggrandizing foreign policy.Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination.On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadershipattitudes which the program is trying to promote.There is compelling evidence that the Soviets have sponsored a number of revolutionary and separatist-irredentist groups, especially in El Salvador, where they directly delivered arms.It was emphasized that revolutionary violence, in the Third World, is not synonymous with terrorism, and that violent revolution would be an issue with which the United States will have to deal for the indefinite future.Pakistani General Mohammad Yousaf quoted him as saying "We should take the books and try to raise the local population against them, and you can also think of sending arms and ammunition if possible."Although no other sources exist for this quote, Steve Coll points not only to Qur'an translation and anti-Russian propaganda, but also Casey's work to establish cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.Initially, this involved close cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan.