Berghuis v. Thompkins
[3] The dissent, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that Miranda v. Arizona and other previous cases had required the waiver of a constitutional right to be much clearer, especially because of the "compelling influence" that an interrogation causes after police have spent several hours pressuring a suspect.Many considered Berghuis the latest in a line of cases eroding Miranda, perhaps "turning the clocks back" on safeguards for people being investigated by the police.The court record suggested that he had been almost completely silent during the three-hour interrogation and the few sporadic comments he made had no bearing on the case[6] (police described it as "nearly a monologue"[7]).[11] Opposing the state's position, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and American Civil Liberties Union filed a joint Amicus Curiae brief that argued the police officers strategically chose to never asked Thompkins if he would willingly waive his Miranda rights because that would have invited him to do so explicitly.In their view, a so-called "waiver-first" rule where the police must ask for a waiver was "the most effective way to avoid the very evil that [Miranda] sought to address, namely that the highly coercive and intimidating custodial environment compels unwilling suspects to speak."[20] She wrote that the case represented "a substantial retreat from the protection against compelled self-incrimination that Miranda v. Arizona has long provided during custodial interrogation",[2] and that "[S]uspects must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent—which, counterintuitively, requires them to speak.It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.and that Miranda and North Carolina v. Butler both agreed that: [a] court 'must presume that a defendant did not waive his right[s]'; the prosecution bears a 'heavy burden' in attempting to demonstrate waiver; the fact of a 'lengthy interrogation' prior to obtaining statements is 'strong evidence' against a finding of valid waiver; 'mere silence' in response to questioning is 'not enough'; and waiver may not be presumed 'simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained'.The Court had previously observed that "while the privilege [against self-incrimination] is sometimes a shelter to the guilty, [it] is often a protection to the innocent" and that "[f]or these reasons, we have observed, a criminal law system which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system relying on independent investigation.[23] UC Berkeley law professor John Yoo, author of the Torture Memos for the Bush Administration, responded in a matching article in the same publication.Yoo predicted that this perspective could influence terrorism cases when the opponents were declared to be at war because "interrogation would seek actionable intelligence to stop attacks, not confessions for use in civilian trials".Yoo speculated that Berghuis may have clarified that Miranda was not relevant where information was not being collected for use at a trial, allowing it to act in mitigation of "weak anti-terrorism policies.She noted the Attorney General's comment that Miranda warnings had not deterred terrorism suspects such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Faisal Shahzad from talking and providing "valuable intelligence".[26] Other legal responses included Stanford University law professor Robert Weisberg, who stated that "this decision authorizes lower courts to construe ambiguous situations in favor of police and prosecutors,"[27] and University of Michigan law professor Richard Friedman, who concluded, "This decision means that police can keep shooting questions at a suspect who refuses to talk as long as they want in hopes that the person will crack and give them some information."[2] Steven Shapiro, legal director of the ACLU, stated on similar lines that Berghuis "seriously undermines" Miranda, in which the court had "recognized that a suspect in police custody can be worn down by prolonged questioning and other interrogation tactics".He further observed that neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General cited any previous example of a court agreeing that a suspect had given an implied waiver after being questioned for over three hours.In Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013), the Supreme Court extended Berghuis by holding that, prior to any arrest, the police are not required to explicitly inform an interviewee that they have a right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.Salinas answered most of the officers' questions, but simply remained silent when they asked him whether shotgun casings found at the scene of the murders would match his gun.Salinas' lawyer wanted the Supreme Court to rule that the simple fact of silence during police questioning, when an individual was not under arrest, could not be used against that person at a criminal trial.[37] In essence the Supreme Court ruled the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause does not protect a defendant's refusal to answer questions asked by law enforcement before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.Notwithstanding popular misconceptions, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not establish a complete right to remain silent but only guarantees that a criminal defendant may not be forced to testify against himself or herself.
Supreme Court of the United StatesL. Ed. 2dMich. Ct. App.N.W.2dE.D. Mich.6th Cir.Miranda v. ArizonaMiranda warningJohn RobertsJohn P. StevensAntonin ScaliaAnthony KennedyClarence ThomasRuth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorU.S. Const. amends. Vsuspectright to remain silentU.S. lawFifth Amendment to the United States ConstitutionSouthfield, MichiganmotionFifth Amendmentwaivedlife imprisonmentparolerepresentationjury instructionsMichigan Court of Appealshabeas corpusfederal District CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitNational Association of Criminal Defense LawyersAmerican Civil Liberties UnionAmicus CuriaeStrickland v. WashingtonDavis v. United StatesJohnson v. ZerbstCornell Law SchoolFindlaw.comJohn YooTorture MemosBush AdministrationObama administration'spre-2001"terrorism-as-war" paradigmanti-terrorism legislationBush DoctrineBrennan Center for JusticeAttorney GeneralUmar Farouk AbdulmutallabFaisal ShahzadKansas City StarThe Bakersfield Californiandefense attorneydistrict attorneypublic defenderThe Philadelphia InquirerUSA TodayThe New York TimesThe Washington PostAssociated PressThe Washington TimesSalinas v. TexasMiranda rightsGrand jurygrant of immunityself incriminationself-regulatory organizationNational Association of Securities DealersList of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 560Encyclopædia BritannicaThe Wall Street JournalWithrow v. WilliamsBiskupic, JoanDenniston, LyleUnited States Fifth Amendmentcriminal procedureHurtado v. CaliforniaEx parte BainWong Wing v. United StatesMaxwell v. DowUnited States v. MorelandBeck v. WashingtonUnited States v. CottonDouble Jeopardy ClauseBlockburger v. United StatesGrady v. CorbinUnited States v. FelixUnited States v. DixonUnited States v. RandenbushBurton v. United StatesFong Foo v. United StatesAshe v. SwensonBurks v. United StatesEvans v. MichiganBravo-Fernandez v. United StatesMcElrath v. GeorgiaUnited States v. WilsonLudwig v. MassachusettsSmith v. United StatesUnited States v. PerezUnited States v. JornUnited States v. DinitzOregon v. KennedyBlueford v. ArkansasBartkus v. IllinoisWaller v. FloridaUnited States v. WheelerHeath v. AlabamaUnited States v. LaraPuerto Rico v. Sanchez ValleGamble v. United StatesDenezpi v. United StatesEx parte BigelowPalko v. ConnecticutLouisiana ex rel. Francis v. ResweberBaxstrom v. HeroldNorth Carolina v. PearceBenton v. MarylandSelf-Incrimination ClauseUnited States v. SullivanGriffin v. CaliforniaWilliams v. Florida