The last command disappeared when Corregidor surrendered on 6 May 1942, while USAFIA became the United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area (USASOS SWPA).In 1943 United States Army Forces in the Far East was reformed and assumed responsibility for administration, leaving USASOS as a purely logistical agency.[5][4][6] The staff, known as the "Remember Pearl Harbor" (RPH) group, selected by the War Department for USAFIA arrived Melbourne 1 February 1942 aboard SS President Coolidge and SS Mariposa in the first large convoy bearing personnel, supplies and munitions intended for transhipment to Java and Philippines as well as Australia.[8][9] What would replace ADBA was the subject of discussions between the Australian and New Zealand chiefs of staff that were held in Melbourne between 26 February and 1 March 1942.The Pacific War Council never became an effective body, and had no influence on strategy, but did allow the Dominions to put their concerns before the President.The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, saw the Pacific lines of communication primarily as a naval responsibility and would not yield command to an Army officer and proposed a division placing all of the Solomons within the Australian area, but excluding the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and New Zealand.[13] While the Army planners, led by Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower, were willing to compromise on a divided command, they objected to placing Australia and New Zealand in separate theatres.The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter between 9 and 16 March, the result of which was a decision to adopt the Navy's plan, with only minor amendments.[14] While this was still going on General Marshall, had contacted Brett and asked him to get the Australian government to nominate MacArthur, whose arrival in Australia was now imminent, as its choice for supreme commander.On 24 March 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive formally designating the Pacific theatre an area of American strategic responsibility.[16] On 17 April 1942 the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, directed all Australian defence forces personnel to treat orders from MacArthur "as emanating from the Commonwealth Government".[17][18] The Army's workshops and fixed fortifications, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)'s logistical and training infrastructure, were not placed under SWPA.[18] Having placed its troops at MacArthur's disposal, the Australian government was adamant that it should be consulted on any alteration to the boundaries or command arrangements in SWPA.[41] In February 1943, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army arrived in SWPA, and its headquarters became that of Alamo Force.[44] Allied Land Forces remained as an important administrative and logistical command,[37] until it was abolished, along with SWPA, on 2 September 1945.[58] Kenney deviated from the normal structure of an air force by creating the Advanced Echelon (ADVON) under Whitehead.The new headquarters had the authority to alter the assignments of aircraft in the forward area, where fast-changing weather and enemy action could invalidate orders drawn up in Australia.[17] On 7 February 1942, he had become commander of the Anzac Area to the east of Australia extending to include Fiji with headquarters in Melbourne.[72] However, Royle agreed to serve under Carpenter as Commander, South West Pacific Sea Frontier, which was formed on 16 March 1943.A training centre, HMAS Assault was established at Port Stephens, New South Wales, and another at Toorbul Point, Queensland.MacArthur proposed that an Australian officer, Captain John Collins, replace Royle as CNS, an appointment that Carpender also supported.[79] At the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the divided command brought the Allies to the brink of disaster when misunderstandings arose between Kinkaid and Halsey.[89] Those assets were inadequate resulting in the creation of a large Army fleet unique to SWPA, the Permanent Local Fleet, under first USFIA, later USASOS and finally Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), starting with the retention of the USAT Meigs, Admiral Halstead and Coast Farmer from the convoy diverted to Brisbane in December 1941.The Australian, British, and US Armies, as well as the RAAF and the RAN all supplied personnel for this formation, which worked on codebreaking and decrypting Japanese message traffic.This included the Services Reconnaissance Department with its Z Special Unit that carried out special operations like Operation Jaywick; Secret Intelligence Australia; the Coastwatchers, who watched for Japanese aircraft and ships from observation posts behind Japanese lines; and the propaganda specialists of the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO).[99] Since quality tended to be more important than quantity in intelligence, this proved to be a fruitful field in which the minor Allies, Australia and the Netherlands, could play a key part.Good intelligence enabled the Allied forces to minimise the risk of failures and maximise the chances of success."[100] The Allied command structure in the South West Pacific Area faced the challenges of coalition warfare in several ways, with varying degrees of success.For Australia and New Zealand, coalition warfare became the norm, and the experience in SWPA proved to be a formative and informative one, with many political and military lessons.
General Douglas MacArthur and Australian Prime Minister John Curtin.
Command Organization, Southwest Pacific Area, July 1943
Royal Australian Air Force
chief
, Air Vice Marshal
George Jones
(left) meeting the Allied air forces commander in the SWPA, Lieutenant General
George Kenney
(right) in mid-1945, in
Manila
.