People's Liberation Army Air Force

[4] The PLAAF traces its origins to the establishment of a small aviation unit by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1924, during the early years of the Republic of China.Despite initial resource constraints, including a lack of aircraft and airfields, the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) established foundational aviation schools and, by the end of World War II, had begun significant organizational developments.Early on, the PLAAF operated a mix of captured Kuomintang (KMT) and Soviet aircraft and began organizing its structure around several aviation divisions.The PLAAF first faced combat in the Korean War against the United States using primarily the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, which also assisted with the expansion of the Chinese aerospace industry.Post-Korean War, the PLAAF focused on enhancing air defense capabilities, a strategy influenced by political decisions to limit offensive operations.In the following decades, especially the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant reforms which included force reduction and reorganization aimed at modernizing its capabilities in line with advancing air power technology.These efforts were somewhat hampered by the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, which resulted in Western sanctions but eventually led to increased military collaboration with Russia in the 1990s.Entering the 21st century, the PLAAF made substantial progress in transitioning to more modern airpower with the acquisition and development of advanced aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-27 and domestic models such as the J-10 and J-20.Today's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) traces its roots back to September 1924 when a small group of nine cadets from the still-young Chinese Communist Party graduated from Sun Yat-sen's military flight school in Guangzhou.Two of the CCP's graduates, Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi, continued to serve in the Soviet Air Force for fourteen years until, in September 1938, they returned to Dihua (now Ürümqi) as instructors.Shenyang Aircraft Corporation built the two-seat MiG-15UTI trainer as the JJ-2,[citation needed] and during the war manufactured various components to maintain the Soviet-built fighters.[13] This was reinforced through the 1950s and 1960s when the PLAAF's main activities were skirmishing with the Republic of China Air Force near the Taiwan Strait, and intercepting American aircraft.The Chinese leadership, in many instances, would cancel offensive bombing missions to prevent escalation, affecting the decision-making autonomy of the PLAAF.[11] Internal political and economic chaos from the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward severely impacted the modernization and development of the PLAAF.[9] In the 1970s, the Culture Revolution (1966–1976) continued to damage the PLAAF readiness, leading to devastating impacts on pilot training, maintenance operation, and logistics.In addition, it had a large number of early-warning, ground-control-intercept, and air-base radars operated by specialized troops organized into at least twenty-two independent regiments.[citation needed] In the 1980s, the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the educational level and improve the training of its pilots.After the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation became China's principal arms supplier, to the extent that Chinese economic growth allowed Russia to sustain its aerospace industry.The overall force strategy is defensive, with the primary objectives limited to protecting cities, airbases, economic and industrial centers, and important institutions and facilities.The Chinese aviation industrial base was inadequate and weak, and China lacked the capacity to produce modern avionics, composites, turbofan engines, and integrated systems.Contracts with the Soviet Union and later Russia also included manufacture license for China to build the Su-27 domestically, which helped the Chinese aviation industry to accumulate know-how and experience.[17] China and Western countries also made several attempted to modernize the aging Chinese fleet in the form of Peace Pearl program and Chengdu Super 7.[27] At the same time, PLAAF leadership advocated for more active roles in the Chinese military but was sidelined by the PLA headquarters due to concerns over political reliability and a general lack of capabilities.[27] The homegrown Chengdu J-10 platform also matured into a highly capable, multirole fighter as PLAAF continued to accumulate experience in operating modern aircraft since the 1990s.[27] By the mid-2000s, PLAAF had grown familiar with precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, AEW&C aircraft, and networked command&control systems.[37] In 2014, the Pentagon noted PLAAF was rapidly closing the gap in its training, equipment, and power projection capabilities with the United States.The force successfully closed the gap with the West due to improved domestic production, introducing indigenously developed airframes, composite materials, turbofan engines, advanced avionics, and weapon systems.PLAAF HQ's peacetime responsibilities are force generation, modernization, and operational control of some units like the Airborne Corps and the 34th Air Transport Division.[72][73] In 2023, the PLANAF transferred the majority of its fixed-wing combat aircraft to the PLAAF, with the intent of simplifying logistics and focusing on carrier based planes.[80] Chinese air defense systems are highly distributed and mobile, in order to improve survivability against SEAD missions.