By destroying all crops and livestock and forcing the mass emigration of civilians from the Panjshir Valley, the Soviets hoped to deprive Massoud of resources to sustain his full-time fighters.Once armored personnel carriers and helicopters arrived, the guerrillas would retreat into the side valleys and carry out small ambushes, rather than openly confront the Soviets.During the four-day operation, the Soviets claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels, but the mujahideen newspaper Call of Jihad put their losses at four killed.[8] The first operation installed a garrison of Afghan troops in a fort in the town of Rokha, but they soon came under siege by the mujahideen and suffered constant losses from harassing fire.[12] By 1982 Massoud had built up his forces to 3,000 men, and other mujahideen from neighbouring areas could come to his aid [13] The approaches to the valley were strengthened with defensive positions established on dominant heights and near narrow passages.The first major offensive was carried out by a force of 12,000 Afghan and Soviet soldiers under the command of General Norat Ter-Grigoryants with 320 armoured vehicles, 155 artillery pieces, and supported by 104 helicopters and 26 airplanes.In some areas the fighting was intense: when a Soviet paratrooper regiment landed east of Rukha, it was quickly encircled and suffered significant losses.The beleaguered paratroopers were saved only by the arrival of a motorised rifle battalion led by Major Aushev, who forced his way through the mujahideen defenses, consisting of well-located strong points, and captured Rukha.[7] Massoud, who expected an attack similar to the previous ones, had disposed his defenses close to the entrance of the valley, and was thus unable to prevent the Soviets from gaining footholds in the Panjshir.During this offensive, the Soviets managed to occupy a large part of the Panjshir and scored some successes against Massoud's organization, such as the capture of a list of the names of 600 of his agents in Kabul.It was accompanied by a heavy aerial bombardment of villages suspected of harbouring rebel groups, notably carried out by Tu-16 bombers flying from inside the Soviet Union.However, attrition among the mujahideen was generally low,[16] and the brunt of the attacks fell on the civilian population, who suffered heavily, many of them preferring to flee the valley.[17] Once the height of the offensive had passed, many areas captured by the Soviet forces were handed over to Afghan army units, who suffered from low morale and high desertion rates.Negotiated by Massoud in person with a colonel of the GRU, Anatoly Tkachev,[7] the agreement stipulated that Soviet troops should evacuate the Panjshir, except for a small garrison at Anava, whose access was controlled by the mujahideen.[19] Massoud took advantage of the truce to extend his influence over areas that had until then been held by hostile factions loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-islami party, like in Andarab District.While Andropov had supported the ceasefire, Chernenko, a disciple of Brezhnev, believed that the guerrillas should be rooted out through military action, an opinion which he shared with Babrak Karmal, president of the DRA.[25] By blocking the mujahideen's withdrawal routes and securing the high ground, the Soviets forced them higher into the mountains than they had previously ventured and scattered their strength as they attempted to avoid being trapped by the helicopter landings.The forts and outposts along the Panjshir Valley were unable to protect roads and convoys as well as they had hoped and these installations proved attractive targets for the mujahideen to harass.Despite provocations ordered by Najibullah's government to draw the Soviets into further fighting, the situation generally remained calm, enabling Massoud to carry out his "strategic offensive", capturing much of Baghlan and Takhar provinces.