Morals, Reason, and Animals
He writes that human beings should extend to animals the same moral protection for the latter's interests that we enjoy for our own.We have come to reject these and many other supposedly natural hierarchies; the history of what we consider moral progress can be viewed as, in large part, the replacement of hierarchical worldviews with a presumption in favor of forms of egalitarianism.Consequently, some reason is needed to justify the fairness of maintaining a hierarchical worldview when we are dealing with animals.[1]The claim that rationality should be prerequisite for moral consideration is challenged by Sapontzis, who argues that the experience of pain is not greater if an individual is more intelligent and that the opposite may well be the case, as individuals who lack the capacity to understand why they are experiencing pain in a certain situation may suffer more as a result.Sapontzis makes a clear distinction between his antispeciesist position and that of environmentalists who are against helping animals suffering in these situations.