Legislative intent

The courts have repeatedly held that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point.Courts frequently look at the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it passed the law: Courts in the United States and elsewhere have developed a number of principles for handling such evidence of legislative intent.One early example of an important US Supreme Court case that relied on legislative intent was Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1904) 196 U.S. 1.Others, most notably United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, have objected generally to the use of such evidence, rather than reliance on the literal language of the statute.For example, the principle that courts should not interpret a statute to produce absurd or unintended results (the golden rule principle) is often informed by evidence of what the proponents of a bill stated on the objectives to be achieved by the statute.
Judicial interpretationConstitutional reviewIn Catholic canon lawIn Islamic jurisprudenceKritarchyStatutory interpretationUltra viresJudicial activismJudicial discretionJudicial restraintGolden ruleInterpretation ActJusticiabilityLetter and spirit of the lawMischief ruleNondelegation doctrinePlain meaning rulePrecedentReasonablenessRule according to higher lawSeparation of powersJudicial independenceParliamentary sovereigntyCommon good constitutionalismIndeterminacy debateLegal realismLegal processLegal formalismLegitimacyLiving ConstitutionLiving treeLiving instrumentOriginalismoriginal meaningOriginal intentlegislative historyPurposive approachStrict constructionismTextualismlegislaturelegislationjudiciarylegislative drafting errorcase lawUnited StatesUS Supreme CourtJohnson v. Southern Pacific Co.United States Supreme CourtAntonin Scaliastatutory constructiongolden rule principleCongressional Research Service