James Jesus Angleton
[6] James Hugh Angleton joined the National Cash Register Corporation, rising through its ranks until in the early 1930s he purchased the NCR franchise in Italy.In November 1944, Angleton was transferred to Italy as commander of Secret Counterintelligence Unit Z, which handled Ultra intelligence based on the British intercepts of German radio communications.In this position, Angleton helped prevent the execution of Italian naval commander Junio Valerio Borghese, whose elite unit Decima MAS had collaborated with the Schutzstaffel during the war.[citation needed] Angleton remained in Italy after the war, establishing connections with other intelligence services and playing a major role in the 1948 Italian general election.Upon his return to Washington after World War II, Angleton was employed by the various successor organizations to the OSS and eventually became one of the founding officers of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.[6] Angleton retained an active interest in Israeli intelligence and maintained connections there throughout his career, believing that émigrés to Israel from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations could be a valuable source of information on their countries of origin.For instance, Shin Bet was crucial in obtaining a transcript of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 speech to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress that denounced Joseph Stalin.[citation needed] As chief of Counterintelligence, Angleton oversaw a ring of informants organized by Jay Lovestone, a trade union leader and former head of the Communist Party of the United States.During this period, Angleton's counter-intelligence staff undertook a most comprehensive domestic covert surveillance project (called Operation CHAOS) under the direction of President Lyndon Johnson.[18][additional citation(s) needed] Angleton also believed that the strategic calculations underlying the resumption of relations with China were flawed based on a deceptive KGB staging of the Sino-Soviet split.[citation needed] This conflict rose in particular regard to Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, who defected from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1961 and 1964, respectively.[22][23] However, other allegations Golitsyn made, including that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Harold Wilson was a Soviet agent and that the Sino-Soviet split was a "charade," were ultimately found to be false.[21] Golitsyn also claimed that a mole who had been stationed in West Germany, was of Slavic descent, had a last name that might end in "sky" and definitely began with a "K", and operated under the KGB codename "Sasha".[12] In 1964, Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer based in Geneva, insisted he needed to defect to the United States, as his role as a double agent had been discovered, and he was being recalled to Moscow.He twice informed the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that he believed Prime Minister Lester Pearson and his successor Pierre Trudeau were agents of the Soviet Union.Colby reorganized the CIA in an effort to curb Angleton's influence and weaken the Counterintelligence branch, beginning by stripping him of control over the Israel desk.During George H. W. Bush's tenure as Director, President Ford authorized the creation of Team B, a project concluding that the Agency and the intelligence community had seriously underestimated Soviet strategic nuclear strength in Central Europe.In his 1994 book Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA, author Mark Riebling claimed that of 194 predictions made in New Lies For Old, 139 had been fulfilled by 1993, nine seemed "clearly wrong", and the other 46 were "not soon falsifiable".[1] Angleton's responsibilities as chief of Counterintelligence have given rise to a considerable literature focused on his efforts to identify Soviet or Eastern Bloc agents working in American secret intelligence agencies.believe this overcompensation was responsible for oversights which allowed Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen and others to compromise American intelligence agencies after Angleton's resignation.Edward Jay Epstein has argued that the positions of Ames and Hanssen—both well-placed Soviet counter-intelligence agents, in the CIA and FBI respectively—would enable the KGB to deceive the American intelligence community, in the manner that Angleton hypothesized.Former Shin Bet chief Amos Manor, in an interview in Ha'aretz, revealed his fascination with the man during Angleton's work to forge the U.S.–Israel liaison in the early 1950s.[50][51] The release was prompted by an internal CIA investigation of the 1970s Church Committee which verified the far-ranging power and influence that Angleton wielded during his long tenure as counter-intelligence czar.