Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth

James Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth,[a] GCMG, CB, PC, DL (17 August 1876 – 15 December 1951), was a British politician and diplomat who was the first Secretary-General of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1933.Before accepting that prestigious position, however, he had served mainly as a private secretary for various British politicians and diplomats, including the Prime Minister H. H. Asquith.[1] Before the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 much work had been put into finding a suitable candidate for secretary-general of the newly established League of Nations.Cecil, who played an important role in drafting the Covenant and organising the League, initially wanted a person with a background in politics for the post; but despite the existence of several candidates, none accepted his proposal.However, after the office would not be given as many powers as initially thought, Cecil reconsidered and sought to find somebody who was a well-trained civil servant and less known as a big political figure.He first approached Maurice Hankey, who for some time showed interest in the position but in the end rejected the offer only ten days prior to the Paris plenary session.No such thing had ever been attempted, and prewar secretariats had largely been confined to the national sphere in both the context of who supplied them and the civil servants who worked there.The creation of an international civil service was not without problems, and administrative leaders thought it unthinkable that such a body would ever be united, loyal or efficient.[10] The personnel staffing the secretariat came from over 30 countries and differed in language, religion and training, all of whom were appointed by the League, not by national governments.He took great care to maintain world peace, as was hoped during the creation of the League, but he also appeased nations, rather than keeping them in check against international law.[16] The ideal underpinning the secretariat and those working there was one much resembling a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy that was also seen in Protestant-secular rationalism, the idea of a non-political, neutral, effective and efficient bureaucrat.Drummond was unable to give a public condemnation of Mussolini's policies, as he had the backing of neither Britain nor France and wanted to maintain good relations with Italy.[25] When the crisis reached its peak, Stimson advised Drummond to "strengthen and support treaty obligations" the Japanese action had caused British discomfort.He noted that "[Mussolini]... had to be treated with great caution when he [was] in 'a highly sensitive condition'"[26] The Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, thought that Perth, as he had now become, was convinced that the harsh attitude of France towards Italy was unreasonable.Ciano, whose Italian secret service efficiency allowed him to read many of Perth's reports, states in his diary that the British ambassador had been opposed to the fascist regime when he came to Rome but had developed into a "sincere convert" who "understood and even loved Fascism".Caution must always be employed in using Ciano's statements, but Perth's reports suggested that there was a certain amount of truth in the remarks:[27] Piers Brendon, who describes Drummond as "peculiarly obtuse even by diplomatic standards", points out that as late as February 1935 he was assuring the Foreign Office that the Italians had "no aggressive intentions" but were "genuinely afraid of overwhelming Abyssinian attack".[31] His pragmatic and co-operative approach resulted in some successes in the early years of the League, but his role is considered inadequate when it was confronted with issues such as the Manchurian Crisis.His involvement in setting the organizational infrastructure in areas such as the dealing with refugees, the minority regime and the mandate system could be seen more positively since during his time, especially during the first half of the 1920s, had some successes in resolving and tackling issues, such as the 1925 Greek–Bulgarian Conflict in 1925 and the 1932–1933 Colombia–Peru War.A combination of his own restricted ability to see the overall situation and Britain's strategy of appeasement of fascist regimes that he served could account as a failure and quite possibly the darkest period of his career.The non-resolution of the Ethiopian Crisis had the effects of undermining League's security role and sending the wrong signals to both Mussolini and Hitler.