Battle of Le Transloy

The German armies on the Somme managed a recovery after the string of defeats in September, with fresh divisions to replace exhausted troops and more aircraft, artillery and ammunition diverted from Verdun or stripped from other parts of the Western Front.On 29 September, General Sir Douglas Haig instructed the Fourth Army to plan operations to advance towards Bapaume, reaching Le Transloy on the right and Loupart Wood north of the Albert–Bapaume road on the left.The area behind the front-line was defended by support and reserve units, dispersed on reverse slopes, undulations and in any other cover that could be found, so that they could open machine-gun fire by surprise, from unseen positions and then counter-attack swiftly, before French and British infantry could consolidate captured ground.In the Gird trenches on the right flank, captured during the preliminary operations, the Special Brigade RE fired oil cylinders from 36 Livens Projectors, a minute before the attack by the New Zealand Division on the left of XV Corps (Lieutenant-General John Du Cane).A high volume of German artillery retaliation when the preliminary bombardment began on 6 October, was maintained but caused few casualties to British troops waiting for zero hour at 1:45 p.m.[26] The XIV Corps objective was a trench line from 100–500 yd (91–457 m) away and on the right flank the 56th (1/1st London) Division (Major-General Charles Hull) attacked with two brigades.[31] Twenty minutes after zero hour, the 11th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment made a frontal attack on Flers Support Trench north of Le Sars but was stopped by artillery-fire and small-arms fire from the left flank.[42] Two tanks had been brought up to Flers in case the night attacks failed and during a lull at 8:00 a.m. one bogged in mud and the other drove to the end of Gird Trench and machine-gunned it for twenty minutes, killing many Germans who ran back to the north-east.[44] In the early autumn, many German divisions which had fought earlier on the Somme were brought back for a second period, in which their performance was considered inferior, despite replacements being of good quality, because of their lack of experienced NCOs and junior officers.The commander of I Battalion, BRIR 16 reported that battlefield conditions were extraordinary, with cold food and artillery-fire causing severe problems, particularly short shooting by German guns, the high number of casualties having depressed morale, made worse by the lack of opportunity to remove the bodies strewn around trenches and tracks.[61] (The Bavarians blamed the Prussians of IR 68, which after the war took 58 pages of the regimental history to explain that the position had been compromised all along, that German artillery had bombarded them constantly, tactical communication had been lost and orders could not be related to the ground.[44] Rupprecht wrote in his diary that the recapture of the north end of Sailly was needed to regain artillery observation but that this would have to wait for the arrival of the XV Corps (General Berthold von Deimling) with the 30th and 39th divisions.The decline in the power of the Anglo-French artillery caused by poor weather and Luftstreitkräfte attacks on artillery-observation machines, enabled the German infantry to mount a costly but successful defence, helped by the knowledge that the onset of winter would end the battle.They appeared to capture their objective very rapidly and with practically no losses while crossing the open.... To sum up: the most startling feature of the operations as viewed from the air was (1) the extraordinary volume of fire of our barrage and the straight line kept by it, (2) the apparent ease with which the attack succeeded where troops were enabled to go forward close under it.Rawlinson complained at the quality of the reconnaissance reports, which with the lack of observation during the rain delays before the attack, led to the British bombardments and barrages being inaccurate, which contributed to the failure of the Fourth Army except east of Gueudecourt and at Le Sars.[79] For the rest of the battle of the Somme, both sides flew in rain, mist, sleet and westerly gales, often at dangerously low heights, to direct artillery and attack troops with guns and bombs.The raid on Vraucourt by twelve bombers and fourteen escorts became the biggest air fight of the war, when approximately thirty German aircraft attacked the formation as it crossed the front lines.On 15 October, the 66th Division exploited a crushing bombardment to capture the remainder of Bois Tripot, Château Saillisel; the 152nd Infantry Regiment and the 68th Battalion Chasseurs Alpins infiltrated between Prussian and Bavarian positions and spent the next six days fighting hand-to hand in the ruins.The troops furthest forward were forced under cover, short of the trench and those on the flanks were unable to advance, which left the 32nd Infantry Regiment in a salient and bombarded by their artillery again, losing 130 casualties in the attack.[96] In 2003, Sheffield described the tactical conditions on the Fourth Army front in similar terms to that of Wilfrid Miles, the official historian and that attacks continued in mud, which slowed movement to a crawl and in which had taken ten hours to move an Australian brigadier to a dressing station.[97] In 2011, Sheffield wrote that the new German defences built behind the third position in the onset of autumn required a series of bite and hold attacks, which were beyond the ability of the British to arrange in time to reach open country.In late September, Haig had ordered an ambitious three-army offensive operation toward Cambrai but despite showing increasing tactical skill and inflicting many losses on the Germans, the territorial gains were "miserly".On 12 October, the Fourth Army attacked with five divisions and had similar results, with some battalions managing to advance 400–500 yd (370–460 m) but none gaining the first objective, due to the weather hampering air reconnaissance and artillery-observation and because German long-range machine-gun fire came from guns dispersed evenly around the battlefield to evade British artillery bombardments.Rawlinson wanted to delay attacks to assure good air support, different zero hours and the digging of jumping-off trenches to orientate the infantry in the featureless landscape and greater depth to creeping barrages, to hit the German machine-guns far to the rear.Harris also wrote of the rain and mud and that the Germans had relieved exhausted divisions during the respite, reinforced the artillery and moved machine-guns to the rear, where they were less vulnerable but could fire through barrages at the British infantry.Fresh troops became exhausted just moving up to the front line and in most of the Fourth Army divisions battalion strengths had fallen from 800 men to about 350, living knee deep in mud, eating cold food and soaking wet.The British Expeditionary Force had become more proficient since July and the French continued to improve but the wet weather, high winds and shorter days made the delivery of supplies to the front line and the evacuation of wounded extraordinarily difficult.[105] The Fourth Army attacked a low ridge running north-west from Le Transloy to Ligny but achieved little success amidst a jumble of trenches, derelict artillery positions and strong points.[107] Haig, Foch and Joffre insisted on continuing the offensive on the Somme, despite the appalling conditions, to support the battles at Verdun and on the Eastern Front, where the Russians were attacking in Galicia and Rumania was being overrun.[112] The systems of organisation and supply to maintain long offensives were not adequate to deliver the vast amounts of food, ammunition and equipment needed by million-man armies, even over the pre-war infrastructure of northern France.[122] It was dry from 20–22 October, as XIV Corps prepared to attack to the far side of the spur in front of Le Transloy, where after a thirty-minute halt, the creeping barrage would move at 50 yd (46 m) per minute, followed by the infantry, whose battalions had fallen lower than half-strength during the recent fighting.

Battle of the SommeFirst World WarLe TransloyBritish EmpireCanadaNew ZealandNewfoundlandUnited KingdomFranceGerman EmpireDouglas HaigHenry RawlinsonFerdinand FochÉmile FayolleJoseph Alfred MichelerErich LudendorffKronprinz RupprechtFritz von BelowMax von GallwitzCanadian CorpscommunePas-de-CalaisdepartmentNord-Pas-de-CalaisSomme OffensiveAlbertFirst dayMontaubanMametzFricourtContalmaisonLa BoisselleGommecourtBazentin RidgeTrônes WoodOvillersFromellesHigh WoodDelville WoodPozièresMouquet FarmGuillemontGinchyFlers–CourceletteMartinpuichMorvalComblesLesbœufsGueudecourtThiepval RidgeEaucourtLe SarsButte de WarlencourtAncre HeightsSchwaben RedoubtStuff RedoubtRegina TrenchBeaumont-HamelHébuterne (1915)Order of BattleBoar's HeadMines, 1 JulyLochnagarHawthorn RidgeLeipzig SalientThiepval MemorialAncre, 1917Western FrontMoresnetInvasion of BelgiumLiègeDinantFrontiersLorraineArdennesCharleroiTrouée de CharmesGreat RetreatLe CateauÉtreux1st St. QuentinMaubeugeGrand Couronné1st Marne1st AisneAntwerpRace to the Sea1st YpresWinter actions1st Artois1st ChampagneHartmannswillerkopfNeuve Chapelle2nd Ypres2nd ArtoisHébuterne2nd Champagne3rd ArtoisGas: WieltjeThe BluffHohenzollern RedoubtSt EloiHulluchWulverghemKink SalientVimy Ridge 1916Mont SorrelVerdun1st SommeAlberichNivelle offensive2nd AisneThe HillsMessinesPasschendaeleLa MalmaisonCambraiGerman spring offensiveMichaelThe Lys3rd AisneBelleau Wood2nd MarneSoissonsAmiensAilette2nd SommeSaint-MihielSt Quentin CanalMeuse-Argonne5th Ypres2nd CambraiCourtraiSambreLys and Escaut1914 Christmas truceFrench Army mutiniesWestern Front tactics, 1917Fourth ArmyBritish Expeditionary ForceArmy Group Rupprecht of BavariaLuftstreitkräftebeaten zoneBattle of MorvalSixth ArmyReserve ArmyHubert GoughBapaumeBattle of Thiepval RidgeChief of the General StaffErich von Falkenhaynarmy groupsBrusilov OffensiveRumaniaOberste HeeresleitungPaul von HindenburgFritz von LoßbergAllainesOrder of battle for the Battle of the SommeSailly-SailliselBeaulencourtThilloyWarlencourt6th DivisionGuards DivisionXIV CorpsYork and Lancaster Regiment23rd Division2nd Canadian DivisionII Corps47th (1/2nd London) Division6th Bavarian Division50th Reserve Division52nd Reserve Division7th Reserve Division6th Bavarian Reserve Division18th Reserve Division2nd Bavarian Division19th Reserve Division28th Reserve Division24th Division40th Division4th Ersatz Division5th Ersatz DivisionMarinekorps-Flandern38th DivisionBavarian Ersatz Division4th Guard Division58th Division1st Guards Reserve Division23rd Reserve Division24th Reserve DivisionCapture of Eaucourt l'AbbayeCapture of Le SarsAttacks on the Butte de WarlencourtSpecial Brigade RELivens ProjectorsNew Zealand DivisionXV Corps